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Abstract. Distributed Leger Technologies (DLTs), most notably Blockchain
technologies, bring decentralised platforms that eliminate a single trusted
third party and avoid the notorious single point of failure vulnerability.
Since Nakamoto’s Bitcoin cryptocurrency system, an enormous number
of decentralised applications have been proposed on top of these tech-
nologies, aiming at more transparency and trustworthiness than their
traditional counterparts. These applications spread over a lot of areas, e.g.
financial services, healthcare, transportation, supply chain management,
and cloud computing. While Blockchain brings transparency and decen-
tralised trust intuitively due to the consensus of a (very large) group of
nodes (or, miners), it introduces very subtle implications for other desir-
able properties such as privacy. In this work, we demonstrate these subtle
implications for Blockchain-based searchable encryption solutions, which
are one specific use case of cloud computing services. These solutions rely
on Blockchain to achieve both the standard privacy property and the new
fairness property, which requires that search operations are carried out
faithfully and are rewarded accordingly. We show that directly replacing
the server in an existing searchable encryption solution with a Blockchain
will cause undesirable operational cost, privacy loss, and security vul-
nerabilities. The analysis results indicate that a dedicated server is still
needed to achieve the desired privacy guarantee. To this end, we propose
two frameworks which can be instantiated based on most existing search-
able encryption schemes. Through analysing these two frameworks, we
affirmatively show that a carefully engineered Blockchain-based solution
can achieve the desired fairness property while preserving the privacy
guarantee of the original searchable encryption scheme simultaneously.
1 Introduction
With the prevalence of cloud computing, many organizations are outsourcing
their data and services to the cloud. By doing so, an organization or individ-
ual can enjoy a wide spectrum of benefits such as agileness and cost-saving.
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Moreover, the cloud service provider can deploy sophisticated cybersecurity
solutions to meet the requirements from the relevant security regulations. It
is widely perceived that the big cloud service providers, such as Amazon and
Microsoft, provide better protection in practice than most organizations if they
do it by themselves. However, there are indeed drawbacks for the outsourced
data and corresponding operations, among which loss of privacy is the most sig-
nificant one. As the cloud service provider can observe the data usage patterns
and potentially have access to the plain data, it becomes a concern when the
data contains sensitive information. The issue becomes more complex when the
services are cross-border and need to comply with privacy regulations from dif-
ferent regimes. Besides privacy, the verifiability of outsourced computing tasks
might also be a serious concern. In order to save cost, the cloud service provider
might not carry out the promised tasks faithfully. At the end, the incomplete
or even flawed computing results might damage the client’s business severely.
Therefore, how to guarantee privacy and verifiability in oursourcing has been
an active research area for many years.
Regarding the potential computing tasks on oursourced data, search is the
most fundamental one. To cater to the privacy needs, searchable encryption
is a category of cryptographic primitives that allows data to be oursourced in
an encrypted form while still being able to be searched. Searchable encryption
typically assumes a standard client-server setting, where a client outsources its
encrypted data to a cloud server, which can then search on the client’s behalf
without decrypting the data. Existing searchable encryption schemes can be
broadly classified into two settings. In the asymmetric setting [2], the client can
publish a public key, by which anybody can generate searchable encrypted data
and store it on the server. Later, the client, who has access to the private key, can
let the server search on its behalf by issuing a token. In the symmetric setting [13],
a client uses symmetric keys to encrypt its own data and stores the ciphertexts
on the server. Later on, as in the asymmetric setting, the client can let the server
search on its behalf by issuing a token. Compared to the symmetric setting, the
asymmetric setting poses higher challenges to data privacy, as shown in [1].
This implies that asymmetric searchable encryption schemes leak much more
information in reality, and potentially make such schemes very undesirable
facing strong attackers. In this paper, we focus on the symmetric setting.
1.1 Preliminary on Symmetric Searchable Encryption
We assume the client has a database DB, which contains the files which will
be searched based on an inverted inverted index. We assume a basic version
of symmetric searchable encryption scheme, which only consists of two stages
Setup and Search. In the Setup stage, the client extracts a keyword setW from
the files in theDB and builds an encrypted inverted index, which is stored on
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the server. In the Search stage, the client interacts with the server to search for
the files which contain any keyword w ∈ W.
Remark 1. Since search is done over an inverted index, the actual files are not
relevant anymore once the inverted index has been constructed. Therefore,
the protection of the real files from DB can be done separately (e.g. they can
be encrypted via standard symmetric encryption schemes and stored on the
same or a different server). As a result, the search will result in file identifiers
instead of real files. Some schemes support additional operations, such as add,
delete or update the encrypted index, while others enable more complex search
queries such as conjuncted keywords. We leave them out for simplicity reasons.
Nevertheless, extending our discussions to these more general schemes will be
an interesting and separate line of research work.
To facilitate our discussions, we provide a high-level workflow of both
stages. Existing schemes might optimize their performances or security with
very specific tricks, e.g. index data structure. Nevertheless, most of them follow
the workflow. In the Setup stage, the following operations will occur.
1. Run by the client, it first generates the key materials, namely private key(s).
2. Given the database DB, a keyword set W is extracted and a plaintext
inverted index is built. The index is informally a table, shown in Figure 1
for example, where each row contains the file identifiers associated with a
specific keyword. Note that the client might choose to pad the rows so that
they contain certain number of files identifiers, e.g. all rows can be padded
to contain the same number of file identifiers.
Fig. 1. Inverted Index Example
3. Using the private key(s), the client encrypts the inverted index and obtains
an encrypted form of it. Note that the encryption here means not only the
hiding of keyword and identifier information but also can be the hiding of
other pattern information such as the ordering of the encrypted keywords
and identifiers. Finally, the encrypted index is stored on the server.
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In theSearch stage, if the client wants to find all the file identifiers associated
with a keyword w, the following operations will occur.
1. Using the private key(s), the client generates a trapdoor Tw based on its
private keys(s) and w, and sends it to the server.
2. With the trapdoor Tw, the server can go through the encrypted index and
match those elements which contain the same keyword (i.e. w) as that em-
bedded in the token.
3. For the matched elements, the server recovers the associated file identifiers,
denoted as a set IDw and return them to the client.
1.2 Privacy and Fairness Challenges
Searchable encryption can be seen as a derivative of standard encryption primi-
tives, but it is more complex due to the fact that, concerning privacy, we need to
consider not only the encrypted index but also the trapdoors. If there is a secure
channel between the client and the server, then the server is the main privacy
attacker. Intuitively, we will expect at least the encrypted index or trapdoors do
not leak any information about the embedded keywords. This can be formu-
lated in a similar way to the semantic security property of encryption schemes
[6], and easy to achieve. However, the situation is more complex for search-
able encryption, due to the fact that search operations link the encrypted index
and trapdoors so that more information will be leaked. In more detail, there
are concerns of access pattern leakage and search pattern leakage. Informally,
access pattern is the file identifier information resulted from the client’s search
queries. While, search pattern is about whether two trapdoors contain the same
keywords or not. These two types of leakages are closely related. After receiving
several trapdoors, even if the server might not learn the keywords, it can derive
statistical information about the keywords based on access pattern. In practice,
the statistical information can disclose the search pattern and even lead to full
recovery of the keywords. Besides privacy, the other practical concern related
to searchable encryption is the verifiability of search results. As we have men-
tioned before, it is desirable for the server to prove to the client that the search
results have come from a faithful execution of the protocol. On the other side, it
is also desirable that the server is rewarded properly for the faithful execution
of the search protocol. Follow the literature work, if a searchable encryption
solution satisfies both requirements simultaneously, we say it is fair.
So far, very little has been done to design privacy-preserving and fair search-
able encryption solutions, except for some recent solutions that leverage on
Blockchain to achieve fairness [3,7]. Being a technology that brings trust as
many believe, Blockchain is infact brings very subtle tradeoffs among the de-
sirable properties, e.g. privacy and verifiability. Unfortunately, these tradeoffs
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have been ignored by many researchers. As such, it remains as an open ques-
tion how well these recent searchable encryption solutions have addressed the
privacy and fairness requirements.
1.3 Contribution and Organisation
Our contribution in this paper is two-fold. We start by examining some recent
Blockchain-based searchable encryption solutions, i.e. [3,7]. We show that di-
rectly replacing the server of a searchable encryption scheme with a Blockchain
is a very undesirable solution. First of all, it introduces considerable cost with
respect to storing the encrypted index and executing the smart contract which
implements the search operation. Secondly, these solutions suffer from the in-
herent issues of Blockchain, e.g. the forking problem. This might cause serious
usability issues for these solutions. Thirdly, the privacy concerns of the under-
lying scheme are amplified by the Blockchain platform. The access pattern and
search pattern leakages are exposed to all entities who can access the Blockchain.
To mitigate the identified issues in our analysis, we propose two frameworks
that can be instantiated based on most existing searchable encryption schemes.
In both frameworks, search operations are carried out by the server(s) as in
the traditional schemes, while Blockchain is leveraged to achieve the fairness
property only.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief
summary to Blockchain technologies. In Section 3, we present and analyse the
existing Blockchain-based solutions. In Section 4, we present our new frame-
works and provide corresponding analysis. In Section 5, we conclude the paper.
2 Blockchain in a Nutshell
Since the seminal report from Nakamoto [8], the concept of Blockchain has
become very popular not only in the research community but also in the society
at large. Its popularity largely comes from the fact that it is the key enabling
technology for the variety of cryptocurrency systems, including Bitcoin 1 and
the altcoins, even though the history of both the idea of cryptocurrency and
the techniques in Blockchain can be traced back to much earlier era [10]. As a
matter of fact, today, there are over 1600 such systems according to Wikipedia 2.
Informally, a Blockchain is organized in the form shown in Figure 2. Depending
on who maintains the chain (i.e. generate and approve new blocks), Blockchain
1 https://bitcoin.org/en/
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cryptocurrencies
5
Fig. 2. Blockchain Structure
systems can be divided into two categories. If anyone can publish and approve
a new block, it is permissionless. Otherwise, if only particular nodes are allowed
to do it, it is permissioned. More details about the categorisation can be found in
the NIST report [15]. From now on, we refer to these privileged nodes as miners
in the paper.
As the core characteristic of Blockchain, repeatedly, a certain number of new
data entries (e.g. transactions) will be packed into a new block and appended
to the existing (longest) chain. In the case of Bitcoin Blockchain, a new block
also includes the hash value of the last block of the current chain. The block is
formed with some specific features, e.g. a proof of work need to be carries out
so that the hash value of the new block contains some number of consecutive
number of zeros. The new block will be broadcast to the whole network, and it
will be accepted in the network after everything being validated. Depending on
the variants and implementations, there are many subtle details on how a block
is formed and accepted to the chain, we refer the readers to the corresponding
technical specifications for the precise information. Nevertheless, the following
useful properties can be expected from a Blockchain.
– Democracy and Decentralised Control. Everyone can potentially act as a miner
and has the same privilege to generate blocks and approve blocks to the
Blockchain. This is generally true for systems employing the proof of work
as the consensus mechanism in the permissionless scenario, while it can
be different in other cases. Regardless, Blockchain eliminates a single fully
trusted party and avoids the single point of failure vulnerability correspond-
ingly.
– Integrity and Immutability. If an attacker or a group of colluded attackers does
not dominate the consensus process, e.g. in the case of Bitcoin Blockchain
more than 51% of the computing power is at the hands of semi-honest
miners (see the explanation below for the semi-honest assumption), then it
will not be able to modify the existing blocks that have been agreed on by
the consensus.
6
– Consistency. There is a single consistent view of the chain even facing strong
attackers, based on assumptions mentioned above. However, note that when
nodes deviate from the predefined rules, forks could be generated and there
will be different views from different players, e.g. in the case of Ethereum3.
These properties further provide certain levels of auditability and transparency,
and generally increase the trustworthiness of the system. Some people have
considered Blockchain as a trust machine for the society 4. These aforemen-
tioned properties or even a subset of them can be very desirable for many ap-
plications from different sectors. The trust that users have towards Blockchain
systems is mainly from the fact that the majority of miners will be semi-honest
from the cryptographic perspective. The semi-honest assumption basically says
that these miners will follow the predefined protocols to perform what has
been specified and programmed in the Blockchain software, and particularly
this excludes the possibility that they will collude to interfere with the nor-
mal Blockchain operations. For PoW-based Blockchain, the trust depends on
the common assumption that 51% of the computing power lies at the hands
of semi-honest miners. While for other types of Blockchain, corresponding as-
sumptions need to be made. For example, for Proof of Stake (PoS)-based DLTs,
we need to assume that the parties that possess the majority of stakes will
behave honestly.
Besides cryptocurrencies, Blockchain systems act as the key foundation plat-
form for smart contracts, which facilitate automated execution of software pro-
grams in a verifiable manner. One of the notable examples is Ethereum 5, which
is the second largest cryptocurrency system after Bitcoin and gains the popu-
larity because of its powerful smart contracts functionality. In practice, smart
contracts can enable a variety of trustworthy distributed applications, e.g. build-
ing digital Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs).
It is worth noting that Blockchain represents one special case of the broader
distributed ledger technologies (DLTs), which are decentralised databases that
rely on independent computers to record, share and synchronize digital transac-
tions. In many cases, say IOTA 6 and Hyperledger 7, the decentralised database
is not organised in a single chain of blocks. Instead, it can be a graph (e.g. IOTA)
or multiple chains of blocks (e.g. Hyperledger). Despite the different froms, a
DLT can possess similar properties to those from a Blockchain. For a more com-
prehensive review of cryptocurrencies, Blockchain and DLT technologies, we
refer the readers to the comprehensive books such as [5,9,14].
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethereum
4 https://www.economist.com/leaders/2015/10/31/the-trust-machine
5 https://www.ethereum.org/
6 https://www.iota.org/
7 https://www.hyperledger.org/
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3 Blockchain-enabled Searchable Encryption
In this section, we first briefly recap the Blockchain-based searchable solutions
from [3,7], and then present our analysis results from the economic, security
and privacy aspects.
3.1 Description of the Existing Solutions
The central idea of solutions from [3,7] is to treat Blockchain (that supports smart
contracts) as a transparent and neutral platform. Intuitively, these solutions just
replace the server in traditional scenarios with a Blockchain, which interacts
with the client via a smart contract. All search and fairness-related logics are
programmed into the smart contract. Based on the transparency and neutrality,
the following notion of ”fairness” can be achieved: (1) search operations will
be performed in the pre-defined manner if we assume that a majority of the
miners will not collude with each other; (2)the miner(s) will be rewarded for
their search operations due to the fact that deposits are required before any
search operation is carried out.
Let the client’s database be denoted asDB. Next we review the solution from
[7]. For simplicity, we only review the Setup and Search stages, while skipping
the add and delete stages as they do not affect our analysis.
– Setup(DB, λ): run by the client, the following operations are performed.
1. Initialize an empty list L, an empty dictionary σ, a counter c, and a block
size p.
2. Extract a keyword setW fromDB.
3. Select two pseudorandom functions F and G; Generate a secret key
K $← {0, 1}λ.
4. For every keyword w ∈ W, do the following
(a) Compute K1 = F(K, 1||w) and K2 = F(K, 2||w), where || is a concatena-
tion operator.
(b) Set α = b |DB(w)|p c and c = 0, where DB(w) is the file identifier set
associated with w and |DB(w)| indicates the number of identifiers in
the set.
(c) Divide DB(w) into α + 1 blocks, and pad the last block into p entries
if necessary.
(d) For each block in DB(w), do the following
i. Set i˜d = id1|| · · · ||idp, r $← {0, 1}λ, d = i˜d ⊕G(K2, r), l = F(K1, c).
ii. Add (l, d, r) to the list L in lex order.
iii. Set c = c + 1.
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5. Set EDB = L, partition EDB into n blocks EDBi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and send them
to the smart contract.
6. For each received EDBi, the smart contract parses each entry in EDBi
into (l, d, r) and add it to the Blockchain.
– Search(K,w; ∗): run between the client and the Blockchain (via the smart
contract), the following steps are followed.
1. The client computes K1 = F(K, 1||w), K2 = F(K, 2||w).
2. The client sets c = 0, and sets an iteration number R and step size step.
3. For 0 ≤ i ≤ R, do the following
(a) The client sets STi = (K1,K2, c) and sends it to the smart contract.
(b) The smart contract asserts the gas cost is lower than the balance, and
then performs the following steps for i = 0 until i ≥ step.
i. Set ` = F(K1, c).
ii. If Get(`) =⊥ stop; otherwise, set the result to be (d, r). The Get
function simply retrieves the tuple with the same `.
iii. Compute i˜d = d ⊕G(K2, r);
iv. Parse and save i˜d.
v. Set c = c + 1.
vi. Set i = i + 1.
The solution from [3] is pretty the same to the above solution. The main
difference is that it assumes a specific electronic health record (EHR) application
scenario and the keyword is in the form of an expression like ”(disease = ‘disease
name‘) AND (num1 ≤ age ≤ num2)”.
3.2 General Analysis w.r.t. Blockchain Usage
From an economic perspective, in comparison to a dedicated server based solu-
tion, it is clear that a Blockchain-based solution will incur more costs regarding
storage and computations, because several miners will need to perform the
same tasks in parallel. The computational cost might become a more significant
concern if a PoW-based consensus is employed by the underlying Blockchain
platform. In connection to fairness, one hidden concern is about the cost model
for the miners of the Blockchain. By default, it is common to estimate the cost
of operations based on the computations incurred by the smart contract execu-
tions. However, the real cost for the miners goes beyond that. For example, there
is also cost for the communication and storage. In addition, the miners need to
guarantee their availability for the searchable encryption services, which means
investment in security and diaster recovery. In the proposed solutions [3,7], it
remains as a question how the client should estimate these costs and include
them in the offer. In connection to search complexity, a potential concern is the
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storage of the encrypted index when addition and deletion are enabled8. Sup-
pose the Blockchain serves for searchable encryption services for many clients,
it will be the case that the newly added encrypted index for a specific client will
not be stored in block(s) which are far away from those storing the previous
encrypted index. This means the search operation may need to traverse through
the whole chain to cover all relevant indexes for the specific client. The situa-
tion gets much worse if a permissionless Blockchain is employed because other
applications will add a tremendous number of blocks over the time.
Contrary to the common belief that Blockchain could act as a ”trust” ma-
chine to build securer applications, it actually brings its inherent security risks
that can be fatal to the applications on top. One prominent security issue is
around smart contracts, where one well-known example is the decentralized
autonomous organization (DAO) attack in 20169, which has exploited some
software bugs in the underlying Ethereum smart contracts, that leads to the
transfer of 3.6 million Ether to the attacker’s account. As a result of the attack,
the Ethereum Blockchain had to make a hard fork due to the lack of an unan-
imous consensus on the solution. Besides smart contracts, Blockchain systems
in general are also subject to other attacks, e.g. those against consensus mech-
anisms and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks [12]. In the traditional
setting, these issues might be easier to avoid or solve, or at least they can be
solved more quickly.
3.3 Specific Analysis w.r.t. Privacy Guarantee
As noted in Section 1.2, searchable encryption schemes leak information to the
server. Although a symmetric searchable encryption scheme leaks less than
its asymmetric counterpart, the leakage might still be considered to be non-
negligible. Take the scheme from Section 3.1 as an example, there are (at least)
two kinds of leakages, which are commonly shared by other similar schemes.
– search pattern leakage. The Search algorithm is a deterministic function. This
means that if the client searches the same keyword more than once, then
the Blockchain miners will notice it. Based on such information, statistics
such as frequency of searched keywords can be established. In turn, such
statistics may allow the miners to recover the underlying keywords.
– access pattern leakage. In the Setup(DB) algorithm, DB(w) will be padded
to guarantee that every block has exactly p entries. However, this padding
operation does not anonymize the index length very well. Let’s assume
DB(w1) has p+1 entries and DB(w2) has 2p+1 entries. In this case, even after
8 Note that such features are included in the solution by Hu et al. [7].
9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_DAO_(organization)
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the padding, the keyword w2 will result in p more entries on the Blockchain
than the keyword w1. As a result, the Search operation may reveal the size
relationship of the file identifier sets associated with the searched keywords.
Specific to this scheme, it is undesirable to reveal i˜d to the smart contract.
Nevertheless, this can be easily resolved by not sending K2 to the smart contract
and instead the client decrypts d by itself to recover i˜d at the end of the search
operation.
In comparison to the traditional scenario without using a Blockchain, where
the privacy information leakage is only limited to a single server, the leakage is
amplified in Blockchain-based solutions. The degree of the amplification effect
depends on which type of Blockchain is chosen by the solution.
– If a permissionless Blockchain is used, then the information leakage is avail-
able to everybody on the Internet. This is very likely not acceptable for most
applications.
– If a permissioned Blockchain is used, then the information leakage is pro-
visionally available to those entities that can access the Blockchain. At the
first glance, the privacy issue is less serious than the other case. However,
the situation is rather complex, unless the searchable encryption scheme is
deployed on a dedicated Blockchain where the right to read the Blockchain
data is controlled by the client. Otherwise, the client will have no control
over who will see its encrypted index and search history (e.g. no control
over who will be the miners), which means it suffer from unexpected pri-
vacy leakage.
For searchable encryption applications, the immutability property of Blockchain
might not be really necessary. In the contrary, this property might be undesir-
able concerning privacy protection. If the encrypted index and search histories
live for ever on a Blockchain, then it will stay as a persistent attack surface for
any (emerging) attackers.
4 Generic Blockchain-based Designs
In the previous section, we have analysed the advantages as well we disadvan-
tages of Blockchain-based solutions. Our analysis indicates that a solution built
directly based on a Blockchain, either permissioned or permissionless, causes
issues from different aspects, including cost, security and privacy. For the stud-
ied solutions, we feel that the disadvantages will outweigh the advantages in
practice. Towards designing privacy-preserving and fair searchable encryption
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solutions, we believe a more reasonable approach is to exploit Blockchain for the
fairness guarantee and to rely on dedicated server(s) for the actual search oper-
ations. To this end, we propose two generic Blockchain-based frameworks, that
can be instantiated based on most symmetric searchable encryption schemes.
In both designs, there are three types of entities involved.
– Client: The client is the party that wants to store its encrypted index at
third-party servers.
– Server(s): As in the traditional setting, the server(s) store the encrypted index
and carry out the search operations.
– Blockchain: The Blockchain acts as a trusted platform to ensure fairness.
4.1 Initial Framework Design
In this design, the client needs to choose multiple servers for the sake of facili-
tating fairness while limiting information leakage to the Blockchain. We assume
there is a secure communication channel ( for confidentiality and integrity)
between the client and all servers, while there is no such a link between any
entity and the Blockchain but we do assume that only the legitimate entity can
communicate with the smart contract (which means a channel with integrity
protection only).
Fig. 3. Initial Design
Suppose there is a symmetric searchable encryption scheme (Setup,Search),
which can be abstracted in the manner of Section 1.1. Shown in Figure 3, leverag-
ing on a Blockchain, the new construction consists of two stages (Setup†,Search†).
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– Setup† Stage: The client chooses n servers which will not collude all together
by assumption. The client then runsSetup n times to generaten independent
encrypted indexes for its database. Finally, the client stores the indexes on
the servers, where every server receives a unique index.
– Search† Stage: Given any keyword w, the search operation goes with the
following phases.
1. Request phase: The client deposits a certain amount of money on the
Blockchain. The money should cover the cost of search operations of the
servers and the operational cost of Blockchain for the whole workflow
(i.e. this and next phases). Simultaneously, the client chooses a random
number r and sends it to all the servers to initiate a search operation.
2. Search phase: Every server verifies that sufficient money has been de-
posited on the Blockchain. If the verification passes, it runs the Search
protocol with the client. Regarding the abstraction of Search in Section
1.1, the server skips Step 3, and instead it does the following.
(a) Compute a hash value of the form: H(IDw||r), where IDw contains
the matched file identifiers and H is a cryptographic hash function.
(b) Run a commitment scheme (e.g. that from [11]) to generate a com-
mitment commit for H(IDw||r).
(c) Store commit on the Blockchain.
3. Validation phase: Every server checks that all servers have sent their
commitments to the Blockchain. If so, it sends its key, which is related
to the commitment scheme, to the Blockchain. The smart contract opens
all the commitments with the corresponding keys and stores H(IDw||r)
on the Blockchain. If all the opened results are the same, then the smart
contract makes a payment using the deposited money to every server.
Otherwise, the smart contract stops and leave the client and servers to
solve the dispute offline.
4. Retrieval phase: If payments have been made, the client requests all the
servers to send back the file identifiers IDw. It can validate the received
IDw based on the hash value H(IDw||r) and the random number r.
It is easy to check that if the client and servers are semi-honest, then the
searchable encryption solution will work properly. Comparing with the solution
from Section 3.1, it is clear that the Blockchain has very light involvement
here: mainly storing deposit and validating the hashed search results, i.e. the
hash values H(IDw||r). Next, we evaluate the overall security of this design by
answering the following questions.
How has the privacy guarantee of the original searchable encryption scheme been
affected? From the perspective of an individual server, it is easy to see that
adapting a searchable encryption scheme to the new framework does not af-
fect the security and privacy properties of the original scheme. In another word,
the information leakage to an individual server remains the same. When several
servers collude, it becomes quite tricky, at least for those schemes which can only
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be proven secure in the indistinguishability-based security models. Neverthe-
less, if the underlying searchable encryption scheme adopts a simulation-based
security definition, e.g. [4], we conjecture that the collusion of all servers leaks
the same amount of information as in the case of a single server. A rigorous
proof of this conjecture will be an interesting future work.
How does the Blockchain affect the privacy and other security properties? As to
data storage related to the index and search results, the Blockchain only stores
H(ID||r) which is a random value if H is modelled as a random oracle. Therefore,
the Blockchain does not affect the privacy guarantee regarding all potential
attackers: one server, multiple servers, and even all servers. To this end, whether
the Blockchain is permissioned or permissionless does not have any impact on
privacy.
How has the fairness property been achieved? We analyse the fairness property
from perspectives of the client and servers, respectively.
– It is easy to check that if at least one server is semi-honest then any mis-
behaved server will be detected and no payment will be made. Here, the
misbehaviour mainly means that a server does not commit to the rightIDw.
It is left as an offline task to figure out who are the cheated servers and how
to compensate for the semi-honest ones.
– Let’s assume the indexes have been generated faithfully by the client in the Setup†
Stage and and the random number r and trapdoors issued to the servers are properly
generated in theSearch† Stage. If all servers carry out the search honestly then
they will be paid by the smart contract in the Validation Phase, regardless
the client’s decision at that point. However, if the client is malicious and
deviates from the protocol specification, e.g. issuing a wrong trapdoor to a
specific server, then even if a server is honest it might not be paid.
As a conclusion, the above design does not provide a full-fledged solution for
fairness because offline operations need to be carried out to solve the dispute
and compensate for all honest behaviours. As a lesson, it tells us that employing
multiple servers do not necessarily lead to the same level of transparency for a
straightforward achievement of fairness. This is due to the fact that we do not
want the client and servers to make their operations transparent and publicly
verifiable for the sake of privacy protection.
4.2 Improved Framework Design
The initial design from the previous subsection has two main caveats. One is
about the security guarantee when several servers collude. The other is that
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the fairness property relies on the assumption that at least one of the servers is
semi-honest and will not collude with the rest. It is easy to check that if all the
servers collude then they can fake the IDw together so that the validation by
the Blockchain will not detect the cheating. In practice, it might be difficult to
decide how many servers should be chosen to fulfill the assumption, i.e. setting
the n parameter. If we simply assume all the servers are semi-honest, a common
assumption in many papers, then both caveats will not be an issue. However, it
is desirable to get rid of them technically. An additional minor caveat is that the
client might misbehave in the protocol, e.g. sends a wrong index to a specific
server, so that fairness will not be achieved even if all servers are semi-honest.
Although this is very unlikely to occur for a rational client in practice, but it
remains as a potential concern.
To eliminate these caveats with technical countermeasures, we propose an
improved design, shown in Figure 4. Since we do not intend to improve or
affect the security guarantee of the original searchable encryption scheme, this
improved design aims at achieving the fairness property while avoiding the
caveats in the initial design. To this end, we let the client sign the encrypted index
and the trapdoors so that no entity can misbehave and deny its misbehaviour.
Public-key encryption and zero-knowledge proofs are employed to preserve the
privacy guarantee of the original scheme. We require also the server to deposit
money on the Blockchain to deter its cheating incentives.
Fig. 4. Improved Design
Suppose there is a symmetric searchable encryption scheme (Setup,Search),
which can be abstracted in the manner of Section 1.1. The improved construction
has two new stages (Setup†,Search†).
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1. Setup† Stage: The client runs Setup to generate a searchable index for its
databaseDB, with the following deviations.
– For each keyword w ∈ W, besides the associated file identifier set IDw,
the client generates a private key Kw and adds an additional virtual
identifier id∗w = H(Kw||IDw) where H is a cryptographic hash function
and IDw denotes the concatenation of file identifiers in lex order. We
further assume that id∗w can be easily distinguished from those identifiers
in IDw.
– The server chooses an EU-CMA (Existential Unforgeability under a Cho-
sen Message Attack) secure signature scheme (KeyGens,Sign,Verify)
and runs KeyGens to generate a sign/verification key pair (sks, vks). It
also chooses an IND-CPA (Indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext
attack) secure public key encryption scheme (KeyGene,Dec,Enc) and
runs KeyGene to generate an encryption/decryption key pair (pke, ske).
Besides the required activities in the original Setup procedure, the client
stores Kw (w ∈ W), sks, and ske locally, and stores the public keys on the
Blockchain. The client also generates a signature sigI for the encrypted index
and stores it on the Blockchain.
We assume the smart contract on the Blockchain platform has been deployed
with the following functions.
– Deposit: the client or the server can call this function to deposit money
which can be used to make payments.
– Dispute: the client can call this function to resolve cheating activities.
– SearchOK: the client explicitly validates the search result and makes a
payment.
2. Search† Stage: Given any keyword w, the search operation goes with the
following phases.
(a) Request phase: Both the client and the server deposit a certain amount
money on the Blockchain, by invoking the Deposit function of the smart
contract. The client’s money should cover the cost of search operation of
the server and the operational cost of Blockchain for the whole workflow
(i.e. this and next steps). While the server’s money should cover the
operational cost of Blockchain for the whole workflow (i.e. this and next
steps) plus a pre-agreed amount for punishing the server’s cheating
behaviour.
At the end of this phase, the smart contract verifies the deposits and
indicates the client and the server to proceed or not.
(b) Search Phase: The server runs the Search protocol with the client. Re-
ferring to the abstraction of Search in Section 1.1, we add the following
extra operations.
– At the end of Step 1, the client chooses a random number r and
generates a signature sigw = Sign(H(r||Tw), sks). It stores sigw on the
Blockchain and shares r with the server.
– At the beginning of Step 2, the server retrieves the sigw from the
Blockchain and verifies it according to the received trapdoor and
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random number r by the Verify algorithm. It also verifies the signa-
ture sigI for the encrypted index. If the verifications pass, it continues
the operations; otherwise it aborts.
– In Step 3, after recovering the file identifiers id∗,IDw, the server en-
crypts them with pke and stores the ciphertext Cw on the Blockchain.
(c) Retrieval & Validation Phase: The client retrieves the ciphertext Cw and
obtains the plaintext: id∗,IDw. Then the client verifies the search results
by checking id∗w = H(Kw||IDw).
– If the verification passes, the client invokes the SearchOK function
which will (1) make a payment to the server and (2) return the
server’s deposit back.
– If the verification fails, the client invokes the Dispute function, by
providing id∗,IDw and a zero-knowledge proofP1 that id∗,IDw are
the plaintext of the ciphertext Cw; the server is required to provide
r, Tw. The Dispute function does the following.
i. Verify the signature sigw based on the received r and Tw. If the
verification passes, it continues; otherwise it (1) pays the server’s
deposit to the client except deducing the amount for smart con-
tract execution cost; (2) stops.
ii. Request the server to upload a copy of encrypted index, denoted
as I, and verify its signature sigI which has been stored on the
Blockchain. If the verification passes, it continues; otherwise it
(1) pays the server’s deposit to the client except deducing the
amount for smart contract execution cost; (2) stops.
iii. Verify the proofP1. If the verification passes, it continues; other-
wise it (1) makes a payment to the server; (2) return the server’s
deposit back; (3) stops.
iv. Execute the Search procedure with Tw to obtain id∗′,ID′w. If
these values are different from id∗,IDw, it (1) pays the server’s
deposit to the client except deducing the amount for smart con-
tract execution cost; (2) stops. Otherwise, it (1) makes a payment
to the server; (2) return the server’s deposit back; (3) stops.
If the dispute function is not invoked, the smart contract (1) makes a
payment to the server; (2) return the server’s deposit back; (3) stops.
It is easy to check that if the client and the server are semi-honest, then the
searchable encryption solution will work properly. Unless there is a dispute
to be resolved, the Blockchain has very light involvement in the new solution:
mainly storing deposits, public keys, the signatures, encrypted search results,
and so on.
Next, we evaluate the overall security of this design by answering the same
questions as those for the initial design.
How has the privacy guarantee of the original searchable encryption scheme been
affected?The main change to the original searchable encryption scheme is adding
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the virtual identifier id∗w for every keyword, and this clearly does not change any
privacy guarantee of the scheme. From the view of the server, the Blockchain
does not provide any new information about the trapdoor and encrypted index.
Therefore, the new design leaks exactly the same amount of information to the
server as in the original scheme.
How does the Blockchain affect the privacy and other security properties? Due to
the fact that the Blockchain only stores the signatures, encrypted search results
and other public information, therefore it does not affect security guarantee of
the original searchable encryption scheme. When a dispute occurs, it will expose
more information such as encrypted index and trapdoor. However this will not
cause any privacy problem, because it does not amplify the privacy concerns
as in the case of solutions analysed in Section 3, due to the fact that only the
encrypted index and one trapdoor is made public on the Blockchain.
How has the fairness property been achieved? Compared with the initial design,
fairness is guaranteed without relying out any assumption on the client.
– We first analyse the fairness property for the client. Note that the added
virtual identifiers id∗w in the Setup
† Stage is a HMAC (hash-based message
authentication code) for the file identifiers associated with the keyword w.
Therefore, after recovering id∗,IDw in the Retrieval & Validation Phase, the
client can determine whether the result is correct or not by verifying this
value. If it is not correct, then the server must have misbehaved because
applying legitimate Tw to legitimate I will result in the correct id∗,IDw.
With respect to the dispute resolution procedure in the Retrieval & Validation
Phase, the server will be punished in either step i, ii, or iv.
– We then analyse the fairness property for the server. For any search query,
if the server honestly carries out the operation, then the following will hold:
(i) a random number r, a trapdoor Tw, and a valid signature sigw stored on
the Blockchain; (ii) the searchable index I is the original one with a valid
signature sigI stored on the Blockchain; (iii) a ciphertext Cw stored on the
Blockchain where the plaintext id∗,IDw are the results of applying Tw to I.
With respect to the definition of the Retrieval & Validation Phase, the server
will receive a payment for its work.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analysed two Blockchain-based searchable encryption solu-
tions and identified a number of issues with respect to economical, security and
privacy issues. We demonstrated that Blockchain is not a silver bullet that can
be used straightforwardly to solve fairness issues in reality. Based on the anal-
ysis, we presented two Blockchain-enabled frameworks which can be applied
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to most existing symmetric searchable encryption schemes to achieve fairness
while preserve the original privacy guarantees. We provided corresponding
analysis to the new designs and compare them to the existing solutions. In
short, leveraging on a Blockchain, the overhead to achieve fairness can be quite
low. As an immediate next step, we will implement the improved framework
and demonstrate its performances with respect to concrete searchable encryp-
tion schemes and Blockchain platforms.
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